Husserl and the Possibility of Solipsism
Keywords:
Solipsism, Idealism, Consciousness, Experience, HusserlAbstract
The article intends to show that, contrary to what has been suggested in many scholarly debates, Husserl’s phenomenology does not suppose a solipsistic approach. I demonstrate this by deeply analyzing some passages of Ideas I and the Cartesian Meditations. To give an account of the concept of Consciousness in Husserl is in part to discuss if the Husserlian Ego entails a pure individual and subjective perspective or if this is actually not the case. I conclude that the last option is more plausible. The outcome of the article poses compelling questions to the nature of Reality from an idealist standpoint.
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